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Abstract: 
This paper reviews the literature on the factors that influence the wealth effects associated 
with the announcements of corporate spin-offs. We use meta-analysis to summarize the 
findings of 26 event studies on spin-off announcements. We find a significantly positive 
average abnormal return of 3.02% during the event window. Returns are higher for larger 
spin-offs, for divestments that are tax or regulatory friendly and for spin-offs that lead to the 
divestiture of a non-related division. We also find that spin-offs that are later completed are 
associated with lower abnormal returns than non-completed spin-offs. In the second part of 
the paper we overview studies on the long-run stock price performance of spin-offs. Even 
though early studies find a long-run superior performance, this effect is no longer found in 
later studies that use more refined statistical tests. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last decades we have seen a large number of companies that reduced their size by 
spinning off one or more divisions. In a spin-off the shares of a firm’s subsidiary are 
distributed pro-rata amongst the shareholders of the company.4 No cash transaction takes 
place. After the spin-off, the shareholders of the parent company hold shares in both the 
parent company and the subsidiary.5 In general, spin-offs are applauded by shareholders. For 
example, in February 2001 Canadian Pacific announced that it was going to spin off four of 
its subsidiaries, including Canadian Pacific Railway and PanCanadian Petroleum. After the 
spin-off Canadian Pacific’s only significant business would consist of Canadian Pacific 
Hotels. On the day of the spin-off announcement, shares of Canadian Pacific went up $ 5.60 
to $ 57.15, resulting in a return of almost 11 per cent on one day. In this paper we review the 
world-wide empirical evidence on the announcement date and long-run performance effects 
of spin-offs.  
The popularity of spin-offs as a divestiture instrument varies widely across different countries. 
A possible reason for that lies in regulatory and fiscal restrictions. In the United States, spin-
offs usually do not have tax consequences. Besides that, there are also no other legal barriers 
for spin-offs. In some European countries, regulation and taxation may cause barriers for spin-
offs.6 For example, until February 1998, spin-offs were legally possible in the Netherlands. 
However, companies had to go through a long range of complicated procedures. Besides that, 
before June 1998, spin-offs in the Netherlands were seen as a distribution of income or capital 
and they were taxed accordingly. Under pressure from several large Dutch companies these 
rules were relaxed in 1998. From February 1998, legal barriers were reduced, creating a much 
simpler legal way to carry out spin-offs. From June 1998 spin-offs were also no longer taxed. 
Instead the fiscal claims were passed on to the future. This opened the way for one of the 
largest European spin-offs in which the Dutch telecom company KPN spinned off its postal 
                                                 
4 Spin-offs are sometimes also referred to as demergers. 
5 There are also several other ways to reduce the size of the company. These include split-ups, split-offs, and 
carve-outs. In a split-up the shares of all the subsidiaries that comprise the firm are distributed. In this form of 
divestiture, the parent ceases to exist. This is also the case in a split-off. In this transaction, the parent’s 
shareholders have to exchange the shares of the parent to obtain the shares in the subsidiaries. In an equity carve-
out, (some of) the shares of the subsidiary are sold to the public. Therefore, this type of divestiture involves a 
cash transaction. In this paper we will restrict ourselves to spin-offs.  
6 See Appendix A of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2006) for a detailed overview of taxation and regulation of 
European spin-offs.  
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division TNT Post Groep.7 Gibbs (1999) states that spin-offs are still taxed unfavorably in 
France, Germany and Switzerland. This probably explains the low occurrence of spin-offs in 
France, where in the period from January 1987 to September 2000 a mere total of 7 spin-offs 
were announced. However, in other European countries spin-offs are more popular. For 
example, for the period from 1987 to 2000, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) document no 
less than 102 spin-offs announced in the United Kingdom.  
In this paper we start by reviewing the empirical studies that have investigated the wealth 
effects associated with spin-offs. This review is in the form of a meta-analysis that is based on 
the methodology of Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan (1992), who do a meta-analysis on wealth 
effects associated with announcements of mergers and acquisitions. In the second part of the 
paper we study the literature on the long-run stock market performance of companies that are 
involved in a spin-off. 
We find 26 papers that present event study results for spin-off announcements. Given that a 
large number of these studies present separate subsamples for specific variables, we have a 
total of 69 observations. The mean abnormal return for the 69 observations is 3.02%. This 
number is significantly different from zero at the 1%-level. Returns are higher for larger spin-
offs. In addition we find that taxable spin-offs are associated with lower abnormal returns. 
Spin-offs that create tax or regulatory advantages give higher abnormal returns. We also find 
that spin-offs of unrelated divisions are associated with higher abnormal returns. An 
unexpected result from the meta-analysis is that spin-offs that are later completed show lower 
abnormal returns than spin-offs that are later withdrawn. This topic requires some additional 
research.  
The factors mentioned in the academic literature are close to those mentioned by practitioners. 
For example, with regard to the earlier mentioned spin-offs by Canadian Pacific, the Chief 
Executive Officer of this company, David O’Brien, states:  
This reorganization is the right step to take for our shareholders, for these five exceptional 
companies, and for the wider investment community. It will reward our shareholders now, by 
unlocking the full value of each business, and in the future, by providing them an excellent 
opportunity to participate in future growth and development of the business and their 
industries. It will better equip each business to pursue even greater success by providing them 
with direct access to public equity markets and shares that can be used as acquisition 
currency and incentive compensation. It will also allow the management of each company to 
                                                 
7 The market value of KPN and TNT Post Groep after the spin-off were respectively US $17.9 billion and US 
$11.6 billion, making it one of the largest spin-offs in Europe. 
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evaluate its growth opportunities and organize its capital structure according to its own 
industry. As well, the investment community will be able to more easily follow and accurately 
value these industry leaders on a stand-alone basis against competitors, benchmarks and 
performance criteria specific to each business sector.8  
In this press release, David O’Brien clearly indicates the improvement of industrial focus as 
one of the reasons for the CP-spin-off. In a questionnaire study, Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and 
Baker (2004) investigate motives for divestitures. They find that the increase of focus is the 
most important reason for 36% of the managers in their study.9  
We also review the papers that study the long-run performance of spun off divisions and their 
parent companies. Early papers find some evidence for a superior long-run performance after 
the announcement period. However, the techniques used in these early papers are criticized in 
the academic literature (see e.g. Fama (1998)). Later studies that use a more refined 
methodology find that there is no evidence of a superior performance of spin-offs after the 
announcement period.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the studies on 
the wealth effects of the spin-offs. Factors that can potentially explain the wealth effects of 
spin-offs are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 includes the model for the meta-analysis as 
well as the results of this analysis. Section 5 analyzes the studies on the long-run performance 
of spin-offs. The paper concludes with Section 6 which summarizes the results of these 
studies and discusses possible topics for future research.   
 
2. Wealth effects of spin-offs 
 
A large number of studies analyze the stock returns that are associated with spin-offs. The 
reason for this is that the shareholders are the most important party in this transaction. All 
these event studies document abnormal returns associated with the spin-off announcement. 
An important problem in analyzing these studies is that most of them use different criteria for 
including spin-offs. For example, some studies only include spin-offs that were eventually 
completed. Other studies also include spin-off announcements that were later withdrawn. In 
                                                 
8 Source: The press release of Canadian Pacific on February 13, 2001 entitled: “Canadian Pacific to enhance 
shareholder value by spinning off its businesses”. See http://www.cpships.com/newsarchivedt.asp?NewsID=156 
for the entire press release. 
9 It should be mentioned that most of the divestitures, which the managers in their sample were involved in, 
consisted of outright sales of units to other firms, rather than spin-offs. 
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addition, many studies try to find out which factors explain the wealth effects of spin-offs, 
with different variables used as factors. In order to review and draw conclusions from all 
these studies we use a meta-analysis technique. We follow the approach of Datta, Pinches, 
and Narayanan (1992) who use a meta-analysis to study the wealth effects associated with the 
announcement of mergers and acquisitions. In our meta-analysis the estimates of abnormal 
returns associated with spin-offs from previous empirical studies are used as observations in a 
multi-factor experiment, with the experimental factors corresponding to the factors 
hypothesized to influence wealth creation. Therefore the abnormal returns are the dependent 
variable. We use a multivariate regression analysis to assess the impact of each factor on the 
dependent variable. 
As a starting point for the meta-analysis we use library catalogues and the internet (Google) to 
select all studies that present event study results for spin-off announcements. These studies 
include papers in academic journals, working papers, and papers in books. This search results 
in 26 studies, of which 21 were published (or are forthcoming in) academic journals, 4 
working papers, and 1 paper published in a book. The papers were published between 1983 
and 2008. We only include papers that present separate results for spin-offs.10 Given that spin-
offs are quite common in the United States, most studies are on that country. However, in 
recent years studies appeared also on Western Europe and on Malaysia. Table 1 summarizes 
the 26 papers and the wealth effects that they report.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
From this table it directly becomes clear that spin-offs are associated with positive abnormal 
returns. The magnitude of these returns is different over individual studies, since they 
generally use different datasets and different methodologies. However, the main conclusion is 
consistent: spin-offs are associated with strongly significant abnormal returns that range from 
1.32% to 5.56%. The only exception is the study of Murray (2000) for the United Kingdom, 
which reports a non-significant abnormal return of -0.19% for the event window from day -1 
to day 1. However, the study of Schauten, Steenbeek, and Wycisk (2001) for the same country 
and for the same event window shows an abnormal return of 2.13%. The studies of Veld and 
                                                 
10 The studies of Koh, Koh, and Koh (2005) for Singapore and Coakley, Thomas, and Wang (2008) for the 
United Kingdom for example were excluded because they only present results for several types of divestitures 
(spin-offs, carve-outs, and sell-offs) together. The study of Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003) was excluded 
because they only report abnormal returns around the date that the spin-off becomes effective.   
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Veld-Merkoulova (2004) and Sudarsanam and Qian (2007) present separate subsamples for 
the United Kingdom. Both studies find significantly positive abnormal returns for the same 
event window of respectively 2.54% and 2.79%. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that in 
all the areas that are studied (United States, Western Europe, United Kingdom, and Malaysia) 
spin-offs are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. 
 
3. Factors explaining wealth effects of spin-offs 
 
This section presents factors that can possibly explain the wealth effects of spin-offs. For each 
factor we select one or two variables for the meta-analysis. 
 
3.1. Improvement of industrial focus 
 
Starting with Berger and Ofek (1995), extensive research has shown that the equity of 
diversified firms is traded at a discount compared to single business firms. A spin-off is a 
relatively simple way to improve the focus of the firm and to avoid the diversification 
discount. Therefore, a spin-off allows the firm to concentrate on its core business. This idea is 
also confirmed in statements by financial analysts. For example, in an article in USA Today 
Peter McKelvey, partner at L.E.K. Consulting says: “Investors have clearly shown unrelated 
businesses are better off separated (..) What sounds theoretically interesting 
together...doesn’t live up to the hype”.11 
There are two different ways in which event studies investigate the effect of an improvement 
of industrial focus. Some studies take the stated objective from the spin-off announcement as 
a starting point. They present abnormal returns for subsamples for which management states 
that the spin-off will be carried out in order to specialize or to go “back to basics” (Hite and 
Owers, 1983, and Johnson, Klein, and Thibodeaux, 1996). Other studies, starting with Daley, 
Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997), define focus-increasing spin-offs as spin-offs in which the 
parent company is in a different industry from the subsidiary or use other measures of focus, 
such as the reduction in the Herfindahl index or the number of segments reported by the firm 
(Desai and Jain, 1999). 
                                                 
11 See: “Many spin-offs prove popular with investors”, USA Today, June 16, 2005, available at: 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/us/2005-06-15-spinoffs-usat_x.htm  
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We use proxies for both ex ante and ex post distinctions in our meta-analysis. The back-to-
basics variable is used for subsamples that are based on the statements of management that 
they announce a spin-off in order to specialize or go back-to-basics. The industrial focus 
variable is used for studies or subsamples that only include spin-offs where the parent 
company is in a different industry from the subsidiary. 
 
3.2. Information asymmetry 
 
Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) present an information-based explanation for spin-offs. 
They derive a model in which a firm can increase its value by spinning off a subsidiary. The 
spin-off will lead to an increase of the number of securities that is traded on the market. This 
makes the price system more informative and, hence, leads to a decrease of information 
asymmetry. This decrease of information asymmetry will lead to an increase of the total value 
of the firm and its spun off subsidiaries.  
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) are the first to test whether firms may engage in a 
spin-off because there is information asymmetry between the management of the firm and the 
external capital market. Like Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997), they argue that it is likely that 
after the spin-off information asymmetry, and hence undervaluation, will decrease. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use a number of different measures of information 
asymmetry; three of these measures are based on data from the Institute of Brokerage for 
Investment Services (IBES) on analysts forecast errors; the remaining two measures are based 
on the volatility around earnings announcements. Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999), Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) also report results for separate subsamples based 
on similar measures of information asymmetry. We include information asymmetry as a 
variable in the meta-analysis.  
 
3.3. Tax treatment 
 
In general spin-offs by American companies do not have tax consequences. However, there 
are some exceptions. Schipper and Smith (1983) and Copeland, Lemgruber, and Mayers 
(1987) argue that in some cases the tax status of a firm can be improved by spinning off 
specific assets. Examples include the formation and spin-off of real estate natural resource 
 9
royalty trusts or oil royalty trusts. These trusts do not pay income taxes and they pay 90% of 
their income as dividends to shareholders. Another example that Schipper and Smith (1983) 
mention is Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). However, Goolsbee and Maydew (2002) 
state that until 2001 it was not sure whether spin-offs of REITs would be taxed. They argue 
that because of uncertainty no firm was willing to take the risk of undertaking a REIT spin-
off. In 2001 the IRS issued a ruling allowing firms to engage in nontaxable REIT spin-offs. 
This was immediately following by a large REIT spin-off of timber properties by Georgia-
Pacific.12 Goolsbee and Maydew (2002) speculate that the IRS ruling would potentially lead 
to a large number of REIT spin-offs with an estimated net tax revenue decrease of $ 823 
million per year. 
In some cases American spin-offs can have negative tax consequences. Copeland, Lemgruber, 
and Mayers (1987) state that, generally speaking, spin-offs are non-taxable for shareholders if 
the spun off entity was (at least 50 percent) controlled by the parent corporation. However, if 
the spin-off is a minority interest it is taxed at the capital gains rate. There is also a possibility 
of partial taxation.   
The tax situation in Europe is largely derived from the so-called “Merger Directive” that was 
adopted by the European Union on July 23, 1990. According to this directive, the capital 
gains taxation on a spin-off is deferred. In other words, the tax authorities consider a spin-off 
as the re-arrangement of investments that the investor already owns, and as a result, levy no 
taxes. This directive applies to intra-community spin-offs. The ultimate intention for this 
directive is its application in all countries within the European Union.13 According to Gibbs 
(1999) tax deferral in spin-offs already occurs in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands (from 1998), 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. He also states that there are several European countries 
where tax authorities see a spin-off as a distribution of income or capital and tax it 
accordingly. This rule applies to France, Germany and Switzerland. In Germany, spin-offs 
can be arranged in a tax-neutral way. However, if more than 20% of the shareholders transfer 
their shares within 5 years after the spin-off, the spin-off will still be taxed (Zaman (1998)). In 
France, the problem is that it is not possible for the company to ask for approval from the tax 
authorities before the transaction is carried out. In both Germany and France, it is not known 
at the announcement date whether the spin-off will be taxed. The decision on the taxation in 
                                                 
12 The spun-off REIT merged with an existing REIT and joined the S&P 500 as Plum Creek Timber Company.  
13 See Raedler (1994). 
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France will only be taken after the spin-off date. In Germany it will depend on the transfer of 
shares in the period after the spin-off.  
Our meta-analysis includes proxies for both tax advantages and taxable spin-offs. These 
variables are based on studies that restrict themselves to spin-offs that are carried out because 
of tax advantages or that separately report subsamples of spin-offs that are carried out for this 
reason (Schipper and Smith, 1983, Copeland, Lemgruber, and Mayers, 1987, Desai and Jain, 
1999, and Michaely and Shaw, 1995) or that report (sub)samples for either taxable or 
nontaxable spin-offs (Desai and Jain, 1999, and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).  
 
3.4. Regulatory motives 
 
Schipper and Smith (1983) argue that regulation may be a motive for American firms to 
engage in a spin-off. They mention two separate cases in which this may apply. The first 
possibility is if a parent spins off a rate-regulated utility. In this case the spun off utility can 
no longer be subsidized by cash flows from unregulated operations. According to Schipper 
and Smith (1983) a loss in subsidy may lead to an increase in the speed and/or magnitude of 
rate increases. The second possibility that they mention is where a multinational firm spins off 
a foreign subsidiary in order to exempt the latter from restrictions imposed by Congress on 
domestic firms operating abroad. Such regulatory advantages do not seem to exist outside the 
United States. 
We include a variable for regulatory advantages in the meta-analysis. This variable is based 
on studies that either restrict themselves to spin-offs that are carried out in order to profit from 
regulatory advantages or that report separate subsamples for such spin-offs (Schipper and 
Smith, 1983, and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).  
 
3.5. Spin-off size 
 
A number of studies find that the wealth effects are larger when the portion of assets that is 
divested is larger. This result is in line with intuition, since the impact of spinning off a large 
division can be expected to be bigger than the spin-off of a relatively small division. We test 
for this effect by including a variable for size in the meta-analysis. 
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3.6. Completed spin-offs 
 
A large number of empirical studies restrict themselves to announcements of spin-offs that 
were later completed. Other studies present separate subsamples for completed and non-
completed spin-offs (see Copeland, Lemgruber, and Mayers, 1987, and Kirchmaier, 2003). 
For this reason we also include a variable for completed spin-offs.  
 
3.7. United States versus other countries 
 
Most of the original research on spin-offs is carried out for the United States. It is interesting 
to see whether the results of other countries corroborate the American results. In this sense the 
studies of countries outside the United States can be considered as an out-of-sample test for 
the question whether spin-off announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns. 
For this reason we include a variable for United States spin-offs.  
 
3.8. Early study 
 
We also want to study whether the results of spin-off announcements have changed 
throughout the years. We study this by including a separate variable for early studies. Early 
studies are defined as studies that were published in 1997 or earlier, with half of our sample 
classified as early studies. 
 
3.9. Publication bias 
 
It is possible that event studies that report significantly positive or negative abnormal returns 
get easier published in refereed journals than event studies that find non-significant abnormal 
returns. For instance, Card and Krueger (1995) find evidence of publication bias in studies on 
the relation between minimum wage and unemployment. We include two variables for a 
possible publication bias. The first variable, Top-3 journal, measures whether the study was 
published in one of the Top-3 finance journals, i.e. The Journal of Finance, Journal of 
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Financial Economics or The Review of Financial Studies. The second variable, SSCI, 
measures whether the study was published in one of the journals included in the Social 
Sciences Citations Index (SSCI). For this purpose we used the list of journals of 2006. 
 
4. Meta-analysis 
 
4.1. Model 
 
To assess the impact of the factors described in Section 3 on the wealth effects of the spin-off 
announcements, we employ a meta-analytic procedure to estimate the significance of the 
hypothesized independent variables on abnormal spin-off announcement date returns. For this 
purpose we follow a replication analysis methodology used by Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan 
(1992) who study merger returns for bidders and targets. The estimates of spin-off 
announcement date abnormal returns from previous empirical studies play the role of 
observations in a multi-factor natural experiment, with the experimental factors corresponding 
to the factors hypothesized to influence wealth creation. The following multiple regression 
approach is employed using the earlier described dummy variables as factors and abnormal 
returns as dependent variables: 
 
ARt = f(Back-to-basics, industrial focus, information asymmetry, tax advantages, taxable 
spin-offs, regulatory advantages, size, completed, United States, early study, Top-3 journal, 
SSCI) 
 
Where: 
ARt    = Abnormal return for event period t 
Back-to-basics = Management statement that spin-off is announced in order to 
specialize or go “back-to-basics” (1 = Statement is made) 
Industrial focus = Parent company is in a different industry from the subsidiary 
(1 = Yes) 
Information asymmetry = Measure of information asymmetry between management of 
the firm and outsiders (1 = High information asymmetry) 
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Tax advantages  = Spin-off leads to a tax advantage (1 = Yes) 
Taxable spin-offs  = Spin-off is taxable (1 = Yes) 
Regulatory advantages = Spin-off leads to a regulatory advantage (1 = Yes) 
Size = Relative size of spin-off compared to total assets of the parent 
firm (1 = Large) 
Completed = Spin-off is completed after the announcement (1 = Yes) 
United States = Study is on American spin-offs (1 = USA spin-off) 
Early study = Year in which study is either published, or the latest draft of 
the working paper (1 = published in 1997 or earlier) 
Top-3 journal = Published in one of the Top-3 finance journals, i.e. The 
Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics or The 
Review of Financial Studies (1 = Yes) 
SSCI = Published in a journal that is included in the list of the Social 
Sciences Citations Index (SSCI) of 2006 (1 = Yes)  
This procedure allows us to test the impact of each independent variable after controlling for 
the effects of the other variables. The regression intercept is the main effect and each dummy 
variable adds or subtracts from the main effect. 
 
4.2. Results of the meta-analysis 
 
The basis for our meta-analysis consists of the 26 studies summarized in Table 1. This sample 
was constructed by searching library catalogues, electronic databases, Social Sciences 
Research Network (SSRN), and the internet (Google and Google Scholar) for studies that 
present event study results for spin-off announcements. In the context of this search we also 
contacted some researchers to ask for their unpublished papers, which they kindly sent to us. 
We are confident that the final data-set of 26 papers comprises the entire available data-set on 
papers that study spin-off announcements. 
Where available we select the event interval from day -1 to day 1. For studies where this 
interval is not available we use the closest possible alternative. For all studies, except Denning 
(1988) this is the interval from day -1 to day 0. For the Denning study we use the interval 
from day day -6 to day 6. Since a large number of the 26 studies present separate subsamples 
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for at least one of the variables mentioned in Section 3 we have a total of 69 observations. 
Table 2 includes the mean and median abnormal returns for spin-off announcements with 
cross-sectional t-statistics and Wilcoxon tests. 
[Please Insert Table 2 here] 
The mean abnormal return for the 69 observations is 3.02%. This number is significantly 
different from zero on the 1%-level. The median is 2.90% and is also significantly different 
from zero at the 1%-level. The minimum abnormal return is -5.29% and the maximum 
abnormal return is 7.80%. The results from the regressions are included in Table 3. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
The first model in Table 3 shows that the back-to-basics variable is not significant. 
Apparently, the fact that the company reports itself that it plans to spin-off a segment in order 
to specialize, or go back-to-basics, does not significantly affect abnormal returns. However, 
the coefficient of the industrial focus variable is significant on the 1%-level. This means that 
the stock market is more positive about a proven going-back-to-basics activity, rather than to 
just rely on what the company reports. The coefficient of 1.34 means that industrial-focus 
increasing spin-offs result in 1.34% higher abnormal returns. The variable for information 
asymmetry is not significant, which casts doubt on this being a motive in practice for carrying 
out a spin-off. Tax advantages and regulatory advantages are both associated with higher 
abnormal returns. Also, the other side of the tax question, taxable spin-offs, shows a 
significantly negative sign (on the 10%-level). Size shows the expected significantly positive 
sign (on the 1%-level). A remarkable result is that completed spin-offs gives a significantly 
negative coefficient (on the 10%-level). Apparently the stock market reacts more positively to 
spin-offs that were ex post not completed. A possible reason for this is that these spin-offs 
were less expected than spin-offs that were later completed and that their announcement had a 
higher information content. Future research should reveal why this is the case. The variable 
for early study is not significant. The variable for United States is also not significant, 
indicating that spin-off wealth effects are not country specific. 
In the second model we include the same variables, but we add the first variable for 
publication bias, Top-3 journal. This variable is not significant. Adding this variable does not 
change the significance level of the other proxies, except that taxable spin-offs and regulatory 
advantages are no longer significant. In the third model we replace Top-3 journal by the 
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second variable for publication bias, SSCI. This variable is also not significant. This suggests 
that the studies we review do not suffer from a publication bias, that is, higher abnormal 
returns found in a study do not increase its chances of being published in a journal that is 
included in the SSCI-index. In this model, taxable spin-offs is significantly negative at the 
10%-level and regulatory advantages is significant at the 5%-level. In addition, the 
significance of the completed variable disappears.  
Finally we run a regression with all the variables that showed a significant sign in at least one 
of the first three models: industrial focus, regulatory advantages, tax advantages, taxable 
spin-offs, size, and completed. The results of this regression are included in the fourth model 
in Table 3. This regression shows significant signs for all included variables. Apparently these 
are the variables that show the strongest effect. The explanatory power of the regressions is 
fairly high. The R2 of the three regressions varies between 0.24 and 0.26 and the adjusted R2 
varies between 0.12 and 0.17.14 
 
5. The long-run performance of companies involved in spin-offs 
 
The results of the meta-analysis presented in Section 4 show that spin-offs are unambiguously 
associated with positive abnormal returns on the announcement day. On average, announcing 
a spin-off increases the value of company equity by about 3%. In only 2 subsamples out of 69 
negative abnormal returns were reported. A related research question that a few studies try to 
answer is whether the wealth effects of spin-offs are limited to the announcement returns, or 
do they persist in the longer-run, after the spin-off is completed. These studies are 
summarized in Table 4. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
The first paper on this topic is by Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993). They study the stock 
price performance of U.S. firms after a spin-off. This stock price performance is calculated 
using Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs). These returns are corrected for returns on 
matching firms. Their paper includes results for parents, subsidiaries, and pro-forma 
                                                 
14 Given that the study of Denning (1988) uses a different event interval from the other studies (day -6 to +6 
instead of day -1 to +1 or day -1 to 0), we have also ran all the regressions without the Denning (1988) study. 
The only result that changes is that the taxable variable in Regression (1) is no longer significant: the t-statistic 
for this coefficient changes from -1.70 to -1.64. For the remainder the results remain unchanged. These results 
are available from the authors on request. 
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combined firms. The latter are created by weighing the return of the parent company, and that 
of the subsidiary, by the market value of the firm on the spin-off date. As can be seen from 
Panel A of Table 4, Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) find a significant long-run 
abnormal performance in the period of 2 years after the spin-off date. Panels B and C show 
that this performance is driven by both the parents and the subsidiaries. Their paper has had a 
large impact in the financial industry. After the publication of this paper, the popular press 
picked up the idea that a strategy of buying parents and subsidiaries involved in spin-offs 
would lead to a superior portfolio performance. There were also reports in the press that 
managers started to implement such strategies in particular investment funds.15   
Fama (1998) criticizes the use of BHARs by Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) and other 
authors on different topics. With regard to the Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) paper he 
writes (page 303): “The t-statistics for the three-year BHARs for spinoffs range from 0.58 to 
2.55, hardly overwhelming. Moreover, in calculating the t-statistics, the BHARs of the event 
firms are assumed to be independent. It would not take a large adjustment for cross-
correlation to produce t-statistics that suggest no real anomaly”. More recent papers on long-
run performance use improved methodologies, such as the one derived by Lyon, Barber, and 
Tsai (1999). They present a method to adjust t-statistics for overlapping samples.  
Desai and Jain (1999) also use the matching firm approach to calculate BHARs. They find 
significantly positive abnormal returns for the 3-year period following the spin-offs (see Panel 
A of Table 4). This result is especially driven by the highly significant returns of the 
subsidiaries. In addition, they find that the returns are much better for focus-increasing 
companies. The abnormal returns for the focus-increasing companies are significant 11.12%, 
20.77% and 33.36% over respective holding periods of one, two or three years following the 
spin-offs. This contrasts to non-significant abnormal returns of -0.96%, -7.66% and -14.34% 
in the same respective periods for the non-focus-increasing spin-offs. However, Desai and 
Jain (1999) do not correct t-statistics for cross-correlation. It is not clear whether such 
adjustment would still have led to significant abnormal returns.16  
McConnell, Ozbilgin, and Wahal (2001) and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) also use the 
matching firm approach, but they apply the methodology suggested by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999) in order to calculate t-statistics. The study of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) does 
                                                 
15 See McConnell, Ozbilgin, and Wahal (2001) for references. 
16 The t-statistic that they report is only 2.17. 
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not find any significant abnormal returns for European companies. A similar result for Europe 
is found by Sudarsanam and Qian (2007). The study of McConnell, Ozbilgin, and Wahal 
(2001) for U.S. firms also shows non-significant returns. In addition they argue that, even 
though their returns are positive, they are largely driven by one large outlier. They conclude 
their paper by stating (page 278): “Overall, from our perspective, the results of our analysis 
indicate that post-spin-off stock returns do not provide robust evidence against the semistrong 
form of the efficient market hypothesis”. 
 
5. Conclusions and topics for future research 
 
In this paper we have reviewed the existing empirical evidence on value creation through 
spin-offs. A meta-analysis using the 26 studies that report wealth effects associated with spin-
off announcements shows a significantly positive average abnormal return of 3.02% during 
the event window. An important result is that spin-offs that lead to an improvement of 
industrial focus are associated with larger abnormal returns. This result confirms the idea that 
dispositions involving assets outside the core business of a firm are viewed by the market as 
value-increasing whereas this does not apply to the disposition of core assets. Daley, 
Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) argue that this confirms a general result on the positive 
relation between firm value and corporate focus (as documented by, e.g., Berger and Ofek, 
1995). The result that larger spin-offs are associated with higher abnormal returns is possibly 
related to the industrial focus result. The divestiture of a large non-related subsidiary is likely 
to be received more favorable than the divestiture of a small non-related subsidiary.  
In addition, we find that returns are higher for spin-offs that receive a tax or regulatory 
friendly treatment. A surprising result is that spin-offs that are later completed are associated 
with lower abnormal returns than those that were not completed. A possible reason for this 
result is that the spin-offs that were ex post not completed were less expected by the market 
participants. Future research should shed more light on this. A possible way to study this 
result is to carry out research around the announcements of spin-off withdrawals. 
Another topic for future research is to acquire more evidence on spin-off announcements 
outside the United States. At this point, the amount of research outside this country is still 
fairly limited with only studies on the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and Malaysia being 
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available. This is very modest, compared to for example the amount of research on initial 
public offerings outside the United States. A third topic for future research is the long run 
performance of spin-offs. It would be interesting to replicate the original study of Cusatis, 
Miles, and Woolridge (1993) using the refined methodology that was developed recently. 
This would give a more conclusive answer to the question whether spin-offs are associated 
with a superior long-run stock price performance. The final and probably most interesting 
topic for future research relates to the fact that there are still many large conglomerates that 
combine many unrelated divisions. Given that spin-off announcements are associated with 
high positive abnormal returns, especially for spin-offs of unrelated divisions, this raises the 
question why these conglomerates are still in one piece. It would be interesting to study why 
this potential for abnormal returns is not exploited.  
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Table 1: Studies of the wealth effects associated with spin-off announcements. 
Study Country Research period Observations Event window Cumulative average abnormal return 
Schipper and Smith (1983) United States 1963-1981 93 (-1, 0) 2.84%*** 
Hite and Owers (1983) United States 1963-1981 123 (-1, 0) 3.3%*** 
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) United States 1963-1980 55 (0, 1) 3.34%*** 
Rosenfeld (1984) United States 1963-1981 35 (-1, 0) 5.56%*** 
Copeland, Lemgruber, and Mayers (1987) United States 1962-1982 188 (-1, 0) 3.03%*** 
Denning (1988) United States 1970-1982 42 (-6, 6) 2.58% n..r. 
Seifert and Rubin (1989) United States 1968-1983 51 (-1, 0) 3.26%*** 
Ball, Rutherford, and Shaw (1993) United States 1968-1990 39 (-1, 0) 2.55% n..r. 
Vijh (1994) United States 1964-1990 113 (-1, 0) 2.90%*** 
Allen, Lummer, McConnell, and Reed (1995) United States 1962-1991 94 (-1, 0) 2.15%***  
Michaely and Shaw (1995) United States 1981-1988 9 (-1, 1) 3.19%n..r.  
Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) United States 1980-1991 37 (0, 1) 1.32%** 
Seward and Walsh (1996) United States 1972-1987 78 (-1, 0) 2.6%*** 
Johnson, Klein, and Thibodeaux (1996) United States 1975-1988 104 (-1, 0) 3.96%*** 
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) United States 1975-1991 85 (-1, 0) 3.4%*** 
Desai and Jain (1999) United States 1975-1991 144 (-1, 1) 3.84%*** 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) United States 1978-1993 118 (-1, 1) 3.28%*** 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) United States 1990-1999 106 (-1, 1) 4.51%*** 
Maxwell and Rao (2003) United States 1976-1997 79 (0, 1) 3.59%*** 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2008) United States 1995-2002 91 (-1, 1) 3.07%*** 
Kirchmaier (2003) Western Europe 1989-1999 48 (-1, 1) 5.4%*** 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) Western Europe 1987-2000 156 (-1, 1) 2.62%*** 
Sudarsanam and Qian (2007) Western Europe 1987-2005 157 (-1, 1) 4.82%*** 
Murray (2000) United Kingdom 1992-1998 25 (-1, 1) -0.19% 
Schauten, Steenbeek, and Wycisk (2001) United Kingdom 1989-1996 23 (-1, 1) 2.13%n..r. 
Sin and Ariff (2006) Malaysia 1986-2002 85 (-1, 0) 1.80%* 
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Notes to Table 1: This table presents the cumulative average abnormal stock returns around the announcement dates of spin-offs. n.r. = 
significance level is not reported for this event window; *** = significance at the 1%-level; ** = significance at the 5%-level; * = 
significance at the 10%-level. 
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Table 2: Mean and median abnormal returns around spin-off announcements 
 
Mean 3.02%*** 
(13.23) 
Standard deviation 1.90 
Median 2.90*** 
(6.84) 
Maximum 7.80% 
Minimum  -5.29% 
Number of positive 
observations 
67 
Total number of 
observations 
69 
 
Notes to Table 2: This table contains the abnormal return statistics of the 69 observations 
for the 26 studies. Test-statistics are in parentheses. The significance of the means is 
tested using a t-statistic. The significance of the medians is tested using the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test; *** = significance at the 1%-level; ** = significance at the 5%-level; * = 
significance at the 10%-level. 
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Table 3: Meta-analysis 
 
Variable Coefficient    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  3.47*** 
(4.13) 
3.51*** 
(4.14) 
3.51***
(3.91) 
3.44***
(6.54) 
Back-to-basics 0.71 
(0.60) 
0.66 
(0.52) 
0.73 
(0.65) 
 
Industrial focus 1.34*** 
(3.59) 
1.32***
(3.67) 
1.41***
(3.92) 
1.39***
(3.59) 
Information asymmetry 0.23 
(0.22) 
0.22 
(0.22) 
0.31 
(0.33) 
 
Tax advantages 1.02*** 
(3.29) 
1.04***
(3.33) 
1.14** 
(2.63) 
0.79*** 
(3.41) 
Taxable spin-offs -0.87* 
(-1.70) 
-0.84 
(-1.46)
-0.94* 
(-1.89)
-0.87**
(-2.28)
Regulatory advantages 0.81** 
(2.61) 
0.68 
(1.65) 
0.88** 
(2.38) 
0.83*** 
(3.52) 
Size 2.76*** 
(6.11) 
2.62***
(4.78) 
2.88***
(5.20) 
2.63***
(6.22) 
Completed -1.09* 
(-1.79) 
-1.15* 
(-1.81)
-1.02 
(-1.59)
-1.03* 
(-1.84)
United States 0.30 
(0.35) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.44 
(0.61) 
 
Early study -0.52 
(-1.62) 
-0.42 
(-1.03)
-0.62 
(-1.49)
 
Top-3 journal  0.25 
(0.51) 
  
SSCI   -0.25 
(-0.43)
 
R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.24 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.17 
Number of observations 69 69 69 69 
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Notes to Table 3: This table contains the results of the meta-analysis based on 69 
observations for the 26 studies that analyze abnormal returns. t-statistics, based on White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the abnormal return for event period t; Back to basics = a statement is made by 
management that the spin-off is announced in order to specialize or go “back-to-basics” 
(1 = Statement is made); Industrial focus = Parent company is in a different industry (1 = 
Yes); Information asymmetry = Measure of information asymmetry between 
management of the firm and outsiders (1 = High information asymmetry); Tax 
advantages = Spin-off leads to a tax advantage (1 = Yes); Taxable spin-offs = Spin-off is 
taxable (1 = Yes); Regulatory advantages = Spin-off leads to a regulatory advantage (1 = 
Yes); Size = Relative size of spin-off compared to total assets of the parent firm (1 = 
Large);  Completed = Spin-off is completed after the announcement (1 = Yes); United 
States = Study is on American spin-offs (1 = USA spin-off); Early study = Year in which 
study is either published, or the latest draft of the working paper (1 = published in 1997 
or earlier); Top-3 journal = Published in one of the Top-3 finance journals, i.e. The 
Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics or The Review of Financial Studies 
(1 = Yes); SSCI = Published in a journal that is included in the list of the Social Sciences 
Citations Index (SSCI) of 2006 (1 = Yes); *** = significance at the 1%-level; ** = 
significance at the 5%-level; * = significance at the 10%-level. 
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Table 4: Long-run stock market performance 
 
Panel A: Pro-forma combined firms 
 
Study Research 
period 
Observations Event window 
   tsp + 6 
months 
tsp + 12 
months 
tsp + 24 
months 
tsp + 36 
months 
Cusatis, Miles, 
and Woolridge 
(1993) 
1965-
1988 
141  4.7% 18.9%** 13.9% 
Desai and Jain 
(1999) 
1975-
1991 
155  7.7% 12.7% 19.8%*** 
Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova 
(2004) 
1987-
2000 
45-61a -2.2% -2.3% 4.2% 2.0% 
Sudarsanam and 
Qian (2007) 
1987-
2002 
129  -2.3% 8.3% 8.4% 
 
Panel B: Parent firms 
 
Study Research 
period 
Observations Event window 
   tsp + 6 
months 
tsp + 12 
months 
tsp + 24 
months 
tsp + 36 
months 
Cusatis, Miles, 
and Woolridge 
(1993) 
1965-
1988 
131 6.8%* 12.5%** 26.7%*** 18.1% 
McConnell, 
Ozbilgin, and 
Wahal (2001) 
1989-
1995 
80 8.6% 13.5% 19.2% 5.1% 
Desai and Jain 
(1999) 
1975-
1991 
155  6.5% 10.6% 15.2% 
Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova 
(2004) 
1987-
2000 
68-106a 3.9% -0.7% 6.5% -0.4% 
Sudarsanam and 
Qian (2007) 
1987-
2002 
129  -3.9% 6.2% 7.1% 
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Panel C: Subsidiaries 
 
Study Research 
period 
Observations Event window 
   tsp + 6 
months 
tsp + 12 
months 
tsp + 24 
months 
tsp + 36 
months 
Cusatis, Miles, 
and Woolridge 
(1993) 
1965-
1988 
146 -1.0% 4.5% 25.5%** 33.6%** 
McConnell, 
Ozbilgin, and 
Wahal (2001) 
1989-
1995 
96 8.9% 7.2% 5.8% -20.9% 
Desai and Jain 
(1999) 
1975-
1991 
162  15.7%*** 36.2%*** 32.3%*** 
Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova 
(2004) 
1987-
2000 
53-70a 12.0% 12.6% 13.7% 15.2% 
Sudarsanam 
and Qian 
(2007) 
1987-
2002 
142  7.2% 17.5% 23.0%* 
 
Notes to Table 4: This table presents the results on the long-run stock performance of 
parents, subsidiaries and pro-forma combined firms involved in spin-offs. The long-run 
performance is measured as the buy-and-hold abnormal return after the spin-off 
completion. tsp represents the spin-off completion date. *** = significance at the 1%-level; 
** = significance at the 5%-level; * = significance at the 10%-level.  
a = the number of observations is different for different event windows (pro-forma 
combined firms: 6, 12, 24, respectively 36 months: 61, 61, 51, respectively 45 
observations; parents: 6, 12, 24, respectively 36 months: 106, 105, 86, respectively 68 
observations; subsidiaries: 6, 12, 24, respectively 36 months: 70, 70, 60, respectively 53 
observations. 
